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Flexibilities were included in TRIPS to allow States to take into
consideration their economic and development needs. States need
to take steps to facilitate the use of TRIPS flexibilities.
United Nations - Human Rights Council'
I. INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years after the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) entered into
force, international intellectual property (IP) law and policy have moved on. 2
Apart from two multilateral agreements on copyright in the framework of the
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO),3 most new treaties on
substantive standards for IP protection are of bilateral, plurilateral, or regional
character. Since the mid-nineties, countries interested in higher IP standards
have successfully shifted IP negotiations away from WIPO and WTO towards
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).4 Here, countries which are otherwise reluctant
to agree to increases in IP protection are able to negotiate trade-offs, such as
obtaining (or avoiding the loss of) preferential access to the markets of their
FTA partners such as the U.S., EU, or Japan.5

I U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Report of the Special Rapporteaur on the eight of eveyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standardofphysical and mental health, T 96, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/12
(Mar. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Report of the Spedal Rapporteau].
2 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of
the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
3 World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty, available at http://www.
wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs-wo033.html; WTPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec.
20, 1996, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs-wo034.htrml [hereinafter
WCTl.
4 On the notion of "regime shifting" in international IP law, see Kal Raustiala, Commentary:
Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Propery Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1021 (2007);
Lawrence R. Helfer, Regime Shfing: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of InternationalIntellectual
Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property at Crossroads:Why
HistoU Matters, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1 (2004).
5 Similar to the "single undertaking" in the WTO, issues such as IP, trade in goods and
services, investment, and, more recently, even labor and environment, are part of an overarching
deal which allows for various quid pro quo trade-offs; see, for example, the subject matter
covered in the first comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) which the European
Community (EC, now EU) negotiated with the CARIFORUM group of Caribbean countries.
Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the
European Community and its Member States, of the other part, Oct. 15, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 289),
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137971.pdf [hereinafter
EC-CARIFORUM EPA].
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The obligations in these FTAs to introduce standards of IP protection
beyond those found in the TRIPS Agreement (TRIPS-plus standards) are
subject to criticism. 6 One central aspect of this critique is the fact that a lot of
the TRIPS-plus standards reduce or eliminate the policy space TRIPS allows for
the implementation of its obligations (TRIPS flexibilities). 7 The trend towards
TRIPS-plus obligations in FTAs has also led to changes in the perception of
TRIPS: initially viewed by developing countries as serving primarily the interests
of the IP exporting industries in the developed world, TRIPS is now often
praised for the flexibilities it offers.8 It seems that-after fifteen years and in
light of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and other
Those demanding stronger IP
initiatives-TRIPS is not so bad after al.
protection in turn initially celebrated the new international standards TRIPS set,
while later calling for new global "gold standards" in areas such as IP
enforcement.' 0 The TRIPS-plus trend is indicative of the long history of
6 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, The
Impact of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of IntellectualProperty Rghts on Human Rbghts,
27-28,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) [hereinafter ECOSOC]; Report of the Special
Rapporteaur, supra note 1, T 68-93. See generall Peter Drahos, Epanding Intellectual Propertj's
Empire: The Role ofPTAs (2003), availableat http://www.grain.org/rightsjfiles/drahos-fta-2003-en.
pdf; QUAKER UNITED NATIONs OFFICE, THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
AND PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE CONTRADICTORY TREND IN BILATERAL AND REGIONAL FREE

TRADE AGREEMENTS (2004), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Occasio
nal/TRIPS-Public-Health-FTAs.pdf.
7 In 2001, the WTO members unanimously recognized the importance of some of these
flexibilities in the public health context in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. See
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1,
41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
8 Fifty-Seventh World Health Assembly, May 17-22, 2004, Scaling up treatment and care within a
coordinatedand comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS, WHA57.14 (May 22, 2004), available at http://
apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA57/A57_R14-en.pdf; Report of the Special Rapporteur supra
note 1,
25-55; see also Various Interventions by WTO Members in the TRIPS Council Meeting,
Minutes of the Councilfor TRIPS Meeting, Agenda Item M (Enforcement Trends), IP/C/M/63, TT 252,
264-266, 272, 276, 291, 298, 300, 318, 319 (June 8-9, 2010) which reflect primarily developing
countries' concerns that TRIPS-plus standards undermine the "flexibility," "policy space," and
"balance" inherent in the TRIPS Agreement.
9 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog that Barked but Didn't Bite: 15 Years of IntellectualProperty Disputes at
the ITO, 1(2) J. INT'L DisP. SETILEMENT 389 (2010). He concludes that
[t]he TRIPS Agreement inspired both exaggerated hopes in the minds of the IP
lobby, and overblown fears in the hearts of NGOs and developing countries....
TRIPS, therefore, was not the beginning of a unidirectional strengthening of
worldwide IP protection. On the contrary, it turned out to be the beginning of a
global wave of IP skepticism.
Id. at 428-29.
10 In relation to ACTA, the EU Commission explained that the rationale for such a new
agreement is to "establish new international norms, helping to create a new global gold standard
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international IP protection whose development has primarily been a one-way
route towards ever increasing levels of protection." This in turn creates the
impression that international treaties on IP protection merely create a "floor"12
consisting of a minimum level of protection, which must be available in all
national laws of the contracting parties, without any apparent limitation as to
the further extension of IP protection.' 3
In recent years, however, various institutions, policy makers, and NGOs
have highlighted the importance of TRIPS flexibilities-especially in the public
health and human rights context-and have called for safeguarding the right of
WTO Members to exercise them against TRIPS-plus obligations in FTAs. On
the international plane, the World Health Organization emphasized that
"Bilateral trade agreements should not seek to incorporate TRIPS-plus
protection in ways that may reduce access to medicines in developing
countries."1 4 Furthermore, the Fifty-Seventh World Health Assembly urges
WHO members
as a matter of priority: . . . (6) to take into account in bilateral

trade agreements the flexibilities contained in the Agreement on
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and
recognized by the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and

on IPR enforcement." Press Release, European Union Commission, European Commission
Seeks Mandate to Negotiate Major New International Anti-Counterfeiting Pact, IP/07/1573
(Oct. 23, 2007).
11 Once rights have been inscribed into the text of an IP convention, they basically become
sacrosanct for now and the future. Revision conferences (with only a few remarkable exceptions,
such as the Revision of the Berne Convention 1971, where an Annex addresses the option for
developing countries to grant compulsory licenses mainly for translation purposes and the
proposed amendment of the TRIPS Agreement in the course of the Doha process; see General
Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005)) have regularly served the
purpose of further strengthening the position of right holders; hardly ever was an effort
undertaken to question or curtail incumbent rules. See Annette Kur & Henning Grosse RuseKhan, Enough is Enough - The Notion of Binding Ceilings in InternationalIntellectual Property Protection,
MAx PLANCK PAPER SERIES ON INTELL. PROP., COMP. & TAX L., 09-01 (2008), available at http://

ssrn.com/abstract= 1326429.
12 See Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: 'Adequate Remuneration' for Non-voluntary Patent
Licensing, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 927, 944 (2008); Raustiala, supra note 4, at n.20.
13 On the question whether international IP law does-or should-contain also maximum
standards or ceilings, see Kur & Grosse Ruse-Khan, supranote 11.
14 World Health Organization, Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and
Public Health, Recommendation 4.26 (2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/
documents/thereport/CIPIHReport23032006.pdf [hereinafter WHO].
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Public Health adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference.15
Similarly, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right to health, in his 2009
report, demanded:
Developing countries and LDCs should not introduce TRIPSplus standards in their national laws. Developed countries should
not encourage developing countries and LDCs to enter into
TRIPS-plus FTAs and should be mindful of actions which may
infringe upon the right to health. 16
In the TRIPS Council Meeting in June 2010, the delegate of India expressed
concerns arising from "the surge of TRIPS plus initiatives in multilateral fora,
RTAs and plurilateral initiatives" and emphasized that these initiatives
are likely to disturb the balance of rights and obligations in the
TRIPS Agreement enshrined in, inter alia, the Preamble, the
objectives and principles in Articles 7 and 8, and have the
potential to constrain the flexibilities and policy space provided
by the TRIPS Agreement to developing country Members, like
India, particularly in areas like public health, transfer of
technology, socio-econornic
development, promotion of
innovation and access to knowledge. They also potentially negate

decisions taken multilaterally, such as the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in the WTO and the
Development Agenda in WIPO.17
Even more important in this context are statements from those countries
which so far have been the main parties demanding TRIPS-plus provisions in
FTAs. Already in 2007, the EU Parliament stressed "that European IPR policy
towards developing countries should not go beyond TRIPs Agreement
obligations, but that it should instead encourage the use of TRIPs
flexibilities."' 8 Furthermore, in the context of the EU-India FTA negotiations,
the European Commission, in an effort to reassure, stated that

15 Fifty-Seventh World Health Assembly, supra note 8.
16 Report of the Special Rapporteur,supra note 1, 1 108.
17 Intervention by India, Minutes ofthe Councilfor TRTPS Meeting, supra note 8, 264.
18 European Parliament Resolution of 22 May 2007 on Global Europe - External Aspects of
Competitiveness, 2006/2292(INI), O.J. (C 102) E/128, 60.
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negotiations on intellectual property rights (IPR) are taken
forward in the spirit of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health .... The Commission has made it
very clear that the provisions on IPR, in particular those on
patents, must be implemented and interpreted in a way that does
not impair the capacity of both parties to promote access to
medicines in the developing world.'9
The EU Commission further emphasised that it has proposed a "clause that
will guarantee that no provision of the FTA will prevent India from using the
flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement" 20 as well as a "legally binding
reference to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health." 21
In the U.S., Congress and the Bush administration reached a bipartisan
compromise on a "New Trade Policy for America" in 2007, which called for
more balance on the position of the U.S. in FTA negotiations regarding issues
related to IP, labor standards, and the environment. In response to concerns
over U.S. FTAs undermining TRIPS flexibilities, the provisions on data
exclusivity, patent extensions, and the linkage between patent protection and
drug approval have been relaxed substantially, while the new template for FTAs
now also includes specific provisions on public health. 22 The latter provisions
state generally that the intellectual property chapter "does not prevent an FTA
23
partner country from taking the necessary measures to protect public health."
These changes were then incorporated into the pending FTAs with Colombia,
Peru, and Panama. 24
More recently, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) affirmed in the 2010
19 Monika Ermert, EU-India Trade Talks Resume Under Cloud Of Concern For Public Health,
27
/eu-india-tr
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.ip-watch.org/wveblog/2010/04/
ade-talks-resume-under-cloud-of-concern-for-public-health/.
20 EU Commission, EU-India FTA Negotiationsand Access to Medicines: Ouestions and Answers, 1 4,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/docib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146191.pdf.
21 Letter from Karel De Gucht to Medecins Sans Fronti&res International (May 25, 2010),
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146192.pdf.
22 See Pedro Roffe & David Vivas-Eugui, A Shift in Intellectual PropertyPolic in US FTAs?, 11(5)
BRIDGES MONTHLY 15 (2007), available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridges/bridges1 1-5.pdf.
23 Brand-Name Drug Industry AlarmedAt IPR PrecedentOf FTA Template, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May
18, 2007, available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/trade/insideustrade05182007.html.
24 Roffe & Vivas-Eugui, supra note 22. For a detailed analysis of these provisions, see Part IV
below. In the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), however, the USTR
reportedly does not feel bound by this bipartisan compromise anymore; see Sean Flynn, USTR
Considering PharmaceuticalPring Restrictions in TPP; Refuses to Follow May 10th Agreement on IPMedicines Issues, IP ENFORCEMENT MAILING LIsT, Feb. 8, 2011 (on file with author).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2011

7

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 2

J. INTELL

332

PROP. L

[Vol. 18:325

Special 301 Report on the protection of IP assets of U.S. companies abroad
that-in accordance with the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health"the United States respects a country's right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all." 25 The report further assures
that
The United States will work to ensure that the provisions of our
bilateral and regional trade agreements are consistent with these
views and do not impede the taking of measures necessary to
26
protect public health.
In sum, not only international organizations, their representatives, and
member states, but also the main state actors on TRIPS-plus FTAs have
recently committed themselves to safeguarding TRIPS flexibilities-in
particular, those relevant in the public health context.
Given all these statements and assurances, the question arises how FTAs
have incorporated these promised policy changes and whether the relevant FTA
provisions really translate political commitments and assurances into binding
treaty language. This Article aims to examine this question from a public
international law perspective. It analyses the relationship between TRIPS
flexibility provisions and TRIPS-plus FTAs. By looking at norms in general
international law, the TRIPS Agreement, and in TRIPS-plus FTAs which
determine this relationship, the main research question is whether and when
TRIPS flexibilities can prevail over TRIPS-plus obligations in FTAs. Part II
begins by exploring the wider international law context for analysing the
relationship between provisions from different treaties. In doing so, it draws on
the discourse about unity, norm conflict, and fragmentation in international law.
Part III then examines the legal relationship between TRIPS and subsequent
FTAs from the perspective of the TRIPS Agreement. In turn, Part IV
scrutinises this relationship from the FTAs' viewpoint-in particular, taking
into account provisions which may function to safeguard the right to exercise
TRIPS flexibilities against TRIPS-plus FTA obligations. Finally, Part V offers
some conclusions.

25 OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVES, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SPECIAL 301
REPORT 13 (2010). The report further emphasizes that "the United States respects our trading
partners' rights to grant compulsory licenses, in a manner consistent with the provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement...." Id.
26

Id.
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATION BETWEEN SUBSEQUENT TREATIES

This Part sets out the international law context for examining the
relationship between TRIPS and subsequent FTAs. Given the substantive
differences between flexibilities in TRIPS and additional protections mandated
under FTAs, the question arises how any potential conflicts between TRIPS
and FTA provisions would be resolved under the rules and principles of public
international law. As international treaties between states, TRIPS and TRIPSplus FTAs are born into the existing body of international law. 27 Their relations
interse therefore are governed by international law. In this regard, the Report of
the International Law Commission (ILC) on the "Fragmentation of
International Law" emphasises that, as a legal system, international law is not a
random collection of norms. Instead, there are "meaningful relationships"
between these different norms in so far as they "act in relation to and should be
28
This also
interpreted against the background of other rules and principles."
applies to FTAs.
In determining the relationship between two valid and applicable
international law normS29 (for example, a TRIPS flexibility rule and a TRIPSplus provision in an FTA), the ILC Report distinguishes between two categories
of norm relationships:
Relationshijs of interpretation. This is the case where one norm
assists in the interpretation of another. A norm may assist in the
interpretation of another norm for example as an application,
clarification, updating, or modification of the latter. In such
situation, both norms are applied in conjunction.
Relationships of conflict. This is the case where two norms that are
both valid and applicable point to incompatible decisions so that
The basic rules
a choice must be made between them.

27 See generaly JoOst Pauwelyn, The Role of Pubc InternationalLaw in the W'TO: Howfar can we go?,
95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 543-47 (2001).
28 U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of
InternationalLaw: Dfficulties Aising from the Diversification and Expansion of InternationalLaw, 1, U.N.
Doc A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006) [hereinafter ILC 1].
29 The ILC Report defines "that two norms are vald in regard to a situation means that they
each cover the facts of which the situation consists. That two norms are applicable in a situation
means that they have binding force in respect to the legal subjects finding themselves in the
relevant situation." Id. n.6.
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concerning the resolution of normative conflicts are to be found
in the VCLT.30
From this distinction, it follows that the relationship between TRIPS
provisions and subsequent TRIPS-plus FTA rules can be analysed as one of
norm interpretation or one of norm conflict.3 ' In the following section, I
briefly review the analytical parameters for the two categories of norm
relations-to the extent they are relevant for examining the relationship
between TRIPS and subsequent FTAs.
A. THE PRINCIPLES OF HARMONIOUS INTERPRETATION AND SYSTEMIC
INTEGRATION

For relationships of norm interpretation, the principle of harmonisation or
harmonious interpretation is primarily relevant. The relationship between two or
more distinct rules of international law in general, and between different treaties
in particular, is foremost governed by the need for a harmonious interpretation,
which operates as a presumption against conflict between the relevant rules. 32
This requires a treaty interpreter to aim for a coherent and mutually consistent
interpretation of the different treaty rules, as much as possible to avoid norm
conflicts between the two treaties. 33 In the same vein, the principle of systemic
integration34 governs the relationship between two distinct treaty norms as a
means of treaty interpretation. This principle has been developed based on
Article 31(3)(c) or the Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
which calls upon a treaty interpreter to take into account "any relevant rules of
30

Id. 12.

As the analysis below shows, these relationships are not mutually exclusive. In particular,
the definition of what constitutes a relevant "conflict" between norms has a strong bearing on
whether a relationship is perceived and understood as one of conflict or one of interpretation; for
further details, see Part II.B below.
32 The ILC Report, before listing the different conflict resolution tools, states, in reference to
the principle of harmonisation: "[I]t is a generally accepted principle that when several norms
bear on a single issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a
single set of compatible obligations."; ILC I, supra note 28, 1 4. On the notion of coherence, see
generally Gabrielle Marceau, A Callfor Coherence in International Law, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 87
(1999).
33 As the International Court of Justice stated in the Right of Passage case: "it is a rule of
interpretation that a text emanating from a Government must, in principle, be interpreted as
producing and intended to produce effects in accordance with existing law and not in violation of
it." See Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Preliminary Objections (Portugal v. India), 1957
I.C.J. REP. 142 (Apr. 12).
3 On the notion of systemic integration, see generally Campbell McLachlan, The Princble of
Systemic Integration andAricle 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 279 (2005).
31
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international law applicable in relations between the parties." 35 Apart from its
important role in determining the relationship between a treaty rule and
customary international law or general principles of (international) law, 36
systemic integration under Article 31(3) (c) VCLT also requires the interpreter to
consider other treaty-based rules so as to arrive at a mutually consistent
meaning between two or more distinct treaties. Such other treaty rules are of
particular relevance where all parties to the treaty under interpretation are also
parties to the other treaty. 37
Since almost all TRIPS-plus FTAs have been agreed to amongst states
which are also Members of the WTO, Article 31(3)(c) VCLT basically covers all
relationships between TRIPS and subsequent TRIPS-plus FTAs. It means that,
for the interpretation of a TRIPS-plus provision in an FTA concluded amongst
WTO Members, any "relevant" rules of TRIPS "shall be taken into account"because all TRIPS provisions amount to "rules of international law applicable in
relations between the parties" in the sense of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT. However,
it does not mean that, vice versa, for the interpretation of TRIPS provisions, all
"relevant" rules of TRIPS-plus FTAs must be borne in mind. Since the FTA
rules apply only in relation between the parties to the FTA, they are not "rules
of international law applicable in relations between the parties" to the TRIPS
Agreement. 38 In sum, both the principle of harmonious interpretation and the
principle of systemic integration determine the relationship between TRIPS and
subsequent FTAs. They operate primarily as presumptions against conflict and
require interpretation of TRIPS and TRIPS-plus treaty provisions as a single set
of compatible treaty obligations.
Illustrations of such a role for the principle of harmonious interpretation
exist especially in cases where the TRIPS-plus FTA rule is ambiguous or opentextured. For example, both the recently concluded Anti-Counterfeiting Trade

35 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
VCLT]. Article 31(3)(c) VCLT provides: "There shall be taken into account, together with the
context . . . (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties." [hereinafter VCLTJ.
36 See McLachlan, supra note 34, at 310-13; ILC I, supra note 28, $T 19-22.
37 The two other cases where one treaty rule affects the interpretation of another one from a
different treaty are where the first treaty rule has passed into or expresses customary international
law, or where this rule provides evidence of the common understanding of the parties as to the
object and purpose of the treaty under interpretation or as to the meaning of a particular term.
ILC 1, supra note 28,1 21.
38 See U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Defficulies Arising from the
Diersification and Expansion of InternaionalLaw,
447-449, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13,
2006) [hereinafter ILC II].
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Agreement (ACTA) 39 and TRIPS contain overlapping rules on border measures
against goods suspected of infringing IP rights."0 Differences amongst these
rules exist, inter alia, as to the safeguards for traders and goods owners. While
Article 56 TRIPS contains a mandatory requirement that the relevant authorities
must have "authority to order the applicant to pay the importer, the consignee
and the owner of the goods appropriate compensation for any injury caused to
them through the wrongful detention of goods," 41 ACTA has no directly
equivalent provision. One might, however, consider the general obligation
under ACTA Article 6:2 which states: "Procedures adopted, maintained, or
applied to implement the provisions of this Chapter shall be fair, equitable, and
shall provide jbr the nrghts of all participants subject to procedures to be appropriately
protected."42 Hence, the general obligation in ACTA Article 6:2 to protect the
rights of all participants to the enforcement procedures can be understood to
include the more specific obligation under Article 56 TRIPS to foresee rights
holder liability for any injury caused to defendants through the wrongful
detention of goods. Furthermore, TRIPS contains in Article 55 mandatory
limits on the duration of the initial detention of goods suspected of
infringement. 43 Although ACTA does not contain an equivalent rule, the
general obligation under Article 6:2 to protect the rights of all participants to
the procedures in an appropriate manner again may apply. ACTA Article 6:2,
therefore, can serve equally as the basis for a harmonious interpretation that
includes the maximum periods of initial detention demanded under Article 55
TRIPS.
The boundaries of this approach are set out in the customary international
law principles of treaty interpretation, which are primarily set out in the general
rule of Article 31(1) VCLT.44 If the ordinary meaning and context of the two

39 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010, openedfor signature May 1, 2011, available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclb/docs/2010/december/tradoc 147079.pdf [hereinafter ACTA].
41 See TRIPS arts. 51-60, as well as ACTA, supra note 39, arts. 13-22. For an overall
consistency analysis of these rules, see Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating
Barriers to International Trade? ACTA Border Measures and Goods in Transit, AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1706567.
41 TRIPS art. 56.
42 ACTA, supra note 39, art. 6:2 (emphasis added). With this additional duty to ensure "for the
rights of all participants subject to procedures to be appropriately protected," ACTA, Article 6:2,
is an extended version of TRIPS Article 41:2.
43 TRIPS art. 55. The general period in Article 55 TRIPS is ten days (with a possible extension
of another ten days "in appropriate cases") within which proceedings leading to a decision on the
merits of the case have to be initiated or the goods released. Id.
44 VCLT, supra note 35, art. 31(1) provides: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose."
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relevant treaty terms, understood in light of their respective treaty object and
purpose, do not allow a mutually consistent understanding of the two terms or
provisions, a harmonious treaty interpretation is not possible. 45 This is
especially true in cases where a TRIPS-plus FTA contains specific and detailed
provisions which differ from the flexibilities that TRIPS foresees. For example,
the concrete and well defined provisions in the U.S.-Australia FTA on
exhaustion of IP rights and compulsory licensing curtail the respective
flexibilities contained in Articles 6 and 31 TRIPS without much room for a
harmonious interpretation. Article 17.9.4 of the U.S.-Australia FTA effectively
prohibits the adoption of a system of international exhaustion which would
46
allow parallel imports (e.g., of patented drugs) from cheaper markets abroad.
Article 17.9.7 then limits the grounds on which compulsory licenses may be
granted to situations where the grant of such licences is necessary in order to
"remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be
anticompetitive," as well as to "cases of public non-commercial use, or of
national emergency, or other circumstances of extreme urgency" if further
conditions are satisfied.47 The U.S.-Australia FTA hence significantly curtails
two (if not three)48 of the TRIPS flexibilities recognized by all WTO members
in the Doha Declaration. 49
Hence, FTA provisions do contain explicit prohibitions of something
TRIPS (sometimes equally explicitly) allows. There is no ambiguity in these
TRIPS-plus treaty terms open to a harmonious interpretation. This leads to the
45 See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Real Partnershipfor Development? Sustainable Development as
Treaty Objective in European Economic Partnership Agreements and Beyond, 13 J. INT'L EcON. L. 139,
162-67; ILC I, supra note 28, 1 21.
4 Each Party shall provide that the exclusive right
of the patent owner to prevent importation of a patented product, or a product
that results from a patented process, without the consent of the patent owner
shall not be limited by the sale or distribution of that product outside its territory, at least
where the patentee has placed restrictions on importation by contract or other
means.
(emphasis added). United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Art. 17.9(4), May 18, 2004, 43
I.L.M. 1248.
47 Id. art. 17.9.7(b)(i)-(iii).
48 In the compulsory licensing context, one may question whether the discretion under the
Doha Declaration, supra note 7, T 5(c), to determine autonomously whether a public health crisis
amounts to a "national emergency" or "other circumstances of extreme urgency" still exists under
the same wording in the U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 46, art. 17.9(7).
49 In the Doha Declaration, supra note 7, T 5, all WTO Members recognized some key public
health related flexibilities in TRIPS-such as the right to decide on the domestic system of
exhaustion, the freedom to choose the grounds on which compulsory licenses may be granted,
and the right to determine autonomously what amounts to a "national emergency" or "other
circumstances of extreme urgency" under TRIPS art. 31(b).
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question whether such situations can be appropriately addressed as relationships
of conflict.
B. DEFINING NORM CONFLICTS

Resolving norm conflicts between international treaties is first of all a matter
of defining what constitutes a true "conflict" of norms. 50 In a strict sense, only
a direct incompatibility-that is, where complying with one rule necessitates the
violation of another-is considered as a conflict.5 ' The WTO Appellate Body
seems to follow this view, 52 but this is not the only perspective on norm
conflicts. A wider understanding takes into account (optional) rights given to
states in a treaty and also finds conflicts when one treaty obligation limits or
53
prevents the exercise of a right another treaty provides for.
In the TRIPS context, choosing a narrow or wide understanding of conflict
is particularly relevant. A TRIPS-plus rule in an FTA may be in conflict with an
optional TRIPS provision as soon as it limits the ability of a WTO Member to
exercise a "right" or flexibility TRIPS provides for. If, in such cases, the
application of TRIPS flexibilities were to prevail over TRIPS-plus FTA rules, it
could make TRIPS flexibilities inviolable and untouchable. They would appear
almost as inalienable rights of WTO Members which cannot be taken away
whenever conflict resolution tools apply in favour of TRIPS. Some support for
such a position comes from paragraph 4 of Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health where WTO Members "reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to
the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provideflexibility," in that
case for the purpose of public health protection. 54
Still, such a far-reaching effect seems to contradict the overall notion of
optional flexibilities in TRIPS; a WTO Member may choose to implement them
(i.e., to exercise its right), but may equally choose not to do so. One must keep
in mind that it is primarily the state's own domestic IP law which provides for
the additional protection, not some external rule imposed upon a country

50 Instructive on this topic in general is JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMs IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).

s1 Id. at 166-67 (citing Wilfred Jenks, Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, [1953] British Yearbook
Int'l L. 401, 426, 451).
52 See the Panel Report, Guatemala - Anti-dumping Investzgation Regarding Portland Cement from
Mexico, 65, WT/DS60/R (Nov. 5, 1998), where the Appellate Body defined conflicts as "a
situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to the violation of the other provision."
53 Pauwelyn, supra note 27, at 551; for an overview on various different approaches to
"conflicts" or "inconsistencies," see ILC II, supra note 38,
21-26; and PAUWELYN, supra note
50, at 167-74.
54 See Doha Declaration, supra note 7, 4 (emphasis added).
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wishing to exercise a TRIPS flexibility. If a WTO Member decides to waive its
right to use a certain flexibility which it has under TRIPS, this is in fact a way of
exercising its right and part of the flexibility TRIPS provides. Applying a wide
notion of norm conflict so as to prevent a WTO Member from doing so may
be thought of as turning the optional rule into a mandatory one.55
In the context of TRIPS-FTA relationships, this argument speaks in favour
of adopting a narrow definition of norm conflict. Hence, only cases where
compliance with one rule necessitates the violation of another would be
considered as a conflict in the technical sense, making it necessary to decide
which norm shall be given preference in application. This narrow definition of
conflict would not eradicate all conflict potential between TRIPS and TRIPSplus FTAs-as long as it is based on the operation of mandatory TRIPS limits
(ceilings) to additional IP protection and a corresponding obligation for such
additional IP protection in an FTA.
This narrow definition nevertheless would exclude apriori the most common
and relevant cases-those where a TRIPS flexibility is undermined by a TRIPSplus FTA rule-from any further discussion about conflict resolution tools and
their application to the TRIPS-FTA relationship. Another counter-argument is
that one must not equate the existence of a conflict with its resolution. in our
context, the assumption that a TRIPS flexibility is in conflict with a TRIPS-plus
rule which undermines the former's operation does not necessarily presume
that this "conflict" must be resolved in favour of the TRIPS flexibility. Similar
considerations have led the drafters of the ILC Report to adopt a wide notion
of conflict which covers any "situation where two rules or principles suggest
different ways of dealing with a problem."5 6 While the important arguments
above counsel a narrow conflict approach, different, equally valid views exist.
A definite decision here is not necessary if one keeps in mind the two different
options when analysing the existing conflict resolution tools. For the purpose
of a thorough analysis of the fate of TRIPS flexibilities, the next section
continues by assessing the relevant conflict norms in international law.
C. CONFLICT RULES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The resolution of a conflict between different treaty-based rules is primarily
dependent on the applicable conflict resolution rules, which may derive from
either of the two (or more) treaties or from general international law.57 Before

s5 For further details, see Part III, below.
56 See ILC II, supra note 38,
25.
s7 See Pauwelyn, supra note 27, at 544-45.
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this Article moves to an analysis of conflict rules in TRIPS and in TRIPS-plus
FTAs, this section examines the application of general international law conflict
norms to the relationship between TRIPS and TRIPS-plus FTAs. These
norms, however, are relevant only to the extent that no specific conflict rules in
either of the treaties-in our case TRIPS or TRIPS-plus FTAs-apply.
The ILC Report identifies legal maxims such as lex specialis (regarding
relations between general and more specific rules), lex posterior (on relations
between prior and subsequent rules), or lex superior (concerning relations
between rules at different hierarchical levels) and their expressions in
international law as primary conflict resolution tools. For the purpose of
examining the relation between TRIPS and subsequent TRIPS-plus FTAs, the
notions of lex posterior and lex specialis, and the general international law rules
associated with them, are of primary relevance.58 In international law, these
conflict resolution tools are, inter alia, expressed in general principles of law (lex
speialis)and in Article 41 and 30 VCLT (lex posterior).
With regard to TRIPS rules and subsequent TRIPS-plus IP provisions in
FTAs, the lex posterior conflict rule demands primary attention since "the lex
posterior principle is at its strongest in regard to conflicting or overlapping
provisions that are part of treaties that are institutionally linked or otherwise
intended to advance similar objectives (i.e., form part of the same regime)."59
The expression of this principle in Article 41 VCLT concerns the question
whether a multilateral treaty allows for some of its contracting parties to
conclude subsequent agreements inter se, whereas Article 30 VCLT deals with

priority in application between all types of subsequent treaties on the same
subject matter. Thus, of all subsequent treaties on the same subject matter,
Article 41 VCLT concerns only those situations where some of the contracting
parties to a multilateral treaty modify their treaty relations amongst each other
(inter se). For these inter se agreements, Article 41 VCLT addresses the
"preliminary question" whether the prior multilateral treaty allows the
conclusion of a bi- or plurilateral treaty. It provides:

58 Since the relation between TRIPS and subsequent TRIPS-plus FTAs does not concern
preemptory rules of international law ius cogens (see VCLT, supra note 35, art. 53) or U.N. Charter
provisions (which prevail over other international law rules, U.N. Charter art. 103), notions of lex
supeiorare of limited relevance here.
26. The ILC Report further notes that, in case of conflicts or
s9 ILC I, supra note 28,
overlaps between treaties in diffrent regimes, the question of which of them is later in time would
not necessarily express any presumption of priority between them.
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Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may
conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as between
themselves alone if:
(a) the possibility of such a modification is provided for by
the treaty; or
(b) the modification in question is not prohibited by the
treaty and:
(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of
their rights under the treaty or the performance of
their obligations;
(ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from
which is incompatible with the effective execution
of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.
Unless in a case falling under paragraph 1(a) the treaty
otherwise provides, the parties in question shall notify the
other parties of their intention to conclude the agreement
and of the modification to the treaty for which it provides.

In relation to the WTO/TRIPS Agreement, post-1995 FTAs with
provisions on IP protection beyond TRIPS standards are such inter se
agreements because they generally are concluded by some Members of the
WTO to modify the TRIPS obligations amongst themselves-mainly by
adopting stronger standards. This would make the FTA's applicability (in
relation to TRIPS) 60 subject to the requirements of VCLT Article 41. TRIPS
does not contain an explicit allowance or prohibition of inter se modifications. 61
Thus, under the two alternatives of Article 41:1(b) VCLT, TRIPS-plus FTAs
(1)

may not affect the enjoyment of TRIPS rights or obligations
by other (non-FTA) WTO Members;

60 The ILC fragmentation report suggests that inconsistencies with the conditions set out by
art. 41 VCLT does not necessarily lead to invalidity of the relevant inter se treaty norm, but that it
should depend on an interpretation of the original treaty as to what consequences should follow.
See ILC II, supra note 38, 319. In relation to the original multilateral treaty, one might generally
assume mere inapplicability (instead of invalidity) of the relevant inter se treaty norm.
61 TRIPS art. 71:2, concerns "Amendments merely serving the purpose of adjusting to higher
levels of protection of intellectual property rights achieved, and in force, in other multilateral
agreements and accepted under those agreements by all Members of the WTO" and therefore
does not concern inter se Agreements such as TRIPS-plus FTAs accepted only by some WTO
Members.
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nor may they affect the effective execution of TRIPS' object
and purpose. 62

Based on the territoriality of IP rights, TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs
generally affect the domestic IP regimes of the FTA contracting parties only.
Equally, TRIPS rights and obligations relate to domestic implementation only,
so that inter se modifications can hardly affect other WTO Members. 63 The
remaining question is whether any TRIPS-plus standard derogates from a
TRIPS rule in a way that is incompatible with the TRIPS objectives expressed
in Articles 7 and 8.64 Given the very general terms used in the balancing
objectives and public interest principles of TRIPS, this standard seems difficult
to apply. Does it mean that VCLT Article 41:1(b)(ii) invalidates any TRIPSplus standard that derogates from a TRIPS provision which is part of the
balance expressed in Article 7 or allows effect to be given to the public interests
addressed in Article 8? Since the effects of inter se modifications in the form of
additional IP protection are generally confined to the national IP regimes of the
modifying parties, this type of inter se derogation from TRIPS flexibilities as
such cannot be viewed as incompatible with the "effective execution of the
object and purpose of the treaty as a whole." 65 Instead, an effect on other IPTO
Members and their ability to implement the TRIPS objectives should be required
for a finding of incompatibility. As argued in relation to the first option under
Article 41:1(b) VCLT, such cases of negative impact on a WTO Member which
is not a contracting party to the FTA will be very rare and exceptional.
Finally, under Article 41:2 VCLT, "the parties in question shall notify the
other parties of their intention to conclude the agreement and of the
modification to the treaty for which it provides." 66 Unless the FTA negotiating
parties have discharged their notification duty with respect to all other WTO

62 VCLT, supra note 35, art. 41:1. On the application of Article 41 VCLT in relation to TRIPS
and FTAs in general, see Andrew Mitchell & Tania Voon, Patents and Public Health in the IVTO,
FTAs and Byond: Tension and Conflict in InternaionalLaw, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 571 (2009).
63 Unless, of course, in the rather unlikely case that the FTA would set standards below those
of TRIPS. For a discussion on how TRIPS-plus rules on seizing goods in transit may affect the
exercise of TRIPS flexibilities by other WTO Members, see Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 40, at
51-58.
5(a), on the role of arts. 7 and 8 as object and purpose
6 See Doha Declaration, supra note 7,
of TRIPS.
65 VCLT, supra note 35, art. 41:1.
66 Id. art. 41:1(b).
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Members, 67 they are acting in violation of Article 41:2 VCLT. However, it
seems doubtful that any inconsistency with this provision will have any
(practical) effect. In sum, cases where TRIPS-plus FTAs may be inapplicable
due to inconsistencies with Article 41 VCLT will be extremely rare.
VCLT Article 30, on the other hand, concerns the application of successive
treaties on the same subject matter.68 In its relevant paragraphs 2-4, Article 30
VCLT provides:
2.

3.

4.

When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not
to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later
treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.
When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to
the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or
suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty
applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible
with those of the latter treaty.
When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the
parties to the earlier one that:
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule
applies as in paragraph 3;
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State
party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which
both States are parties governs their mutual rights and
obligations.

VCLT Article 30:2 contains an exception from the general lex posteior derogat
legi priori principle embodied in VCLT Articles 30:3 and 4. Article 30:2 applies
to provisions which indicate the intention of the negotiating parties that, instead
of the later, the earlier treaty shall prevail. Classic examples in the international
IP context are Article 2:2 TRIPS or Article 1:2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty,
each of which states that its provisions shall not "derogate from existing
obligations" under various preexisting multilateral IP treaties, such as the Berne
Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 69 As will be

67 See the WTO notification mechanism regarding Regional Trade Agreements under art.
XXIV GATT or art. V GATS at WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System, http://
rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx.
68 On the operation of art. 30 VCLT as a conflict norm, see ILC II, supra note 38,
251.
69 See, e.g., TRIPS art. 2:2 ("Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from
existing obligations that Members may have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne
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examined in more detail below, TRIPS-plus FTAs contain several variations on
these types of conflict clauses. In the absence of such a clause, the general rule
in Article 30:3 VCLT resolves conflicts between provisions deriving from
subsequent treaties on the same subject matter in favour of the later treaty
provision. Thus any subsequent TRIPS-plus FTA provision would prevail in its
application over a TRIPS rule to the extent that these provisions are in conflict.
However, this applies only for those contracting parties which are bound by
both the earlier and the later treaty-in our case, only to those WTO Members
which are equally bound by the subsequent FTA. 70 For WTO Members which
are not bound by the potentially conflicting TRIPS-plus FTA rule, Article
30:4(b) VCLT makes clear that, regarding their relation to the FTA parties,
TRIPS prevails. In essence, this is an expression of the general principle
embodied in VCLT Article 34 that "a treaty does not create either obligations
or rights for a third State without its consent."71
Finally, the notion of lex specialis derogat legi generall may function as a relevant
conflict resolution tool between TRIPS and TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs.
As a general principle of (international) law, it suggests that, whenever two or
more norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be given to the
norm that is more specific since it often takes better account of the particular
context addressed or creates a more equitable result.72 Of course, the lex spenalis
principle only applies between those states which are bound by both norms-in
this case the two international IP treaties. A classic example of application of
lex speialis between provisions of distinct international IP treaties are those
WIPO Copyright Treaty rules which clarify the application of certain more
general rules of the Berne Convention in the digital network environment.73 In
relation to TRIPS and TRIPS-plus FTAs, one could assume that the often
specific and very detailed provisions-for example, on the protection of test

Convention, the Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of
Integrated Circuits.").
7o See VCLT, supra note 35, art. 30:4(a).
71 Id. art. 34.

72 ILC I, supra note 28, T 5.
73 An agreed statement concerning Article 1(4) WCT for example states:
The reproduction right, as set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and the
exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in the digital environment, in
particular to the use of works in digital form. It is understood that the storage
of a protected work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a
reproduction within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention.
WCT, supra note 3, Agreed Statement concerning Art. 1(4). Further, Articles 4 and 5 (and their
respective Agreed Statements) clarify the application of the notion of "literary works" under
Article 2 of the Berne Convention to software and databases.
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data or geographical indicationS74-are lex specialis to the more general rules
contained in TRIPS. In at least one instance, an FTA explicitly considers its IP
provisions as specifying TRIPS.7 5
Such a result would nevertheless not necessarily entail that the TRIPS rule is
set aside between the FTA partners. Being the more general rule, it "will
remain valid and applicable and will, in accordance with the principle of
harmonization. . ., continue to give direction for the interpretation and
application of the relevant special law and will become fully applicable in
situations not provided for by the latter."7 6 The ILC report further notes that,
in scenarios where the special law might frustrate the purpose of the general
law, where third party beneficiaries are negatively affected by the special law,
and where the balance of rights and obligations established in the general law
77
would be negatively affected by the special law, the general law prevails.
Especially the last situation may provide a relevant exception to the operation
of the lex speialis rule in cases of TRIPS-plus FTA provisions which tilt the
balance of rights and obligations mentioned in the TRIPS objectives in Article 7
too heavily in favour of rights holders. The scope of application of the lex
rpedalis maxim hence depends on the individual TRIPS rule and its TRIPS-plus
counterpart.
In sum, the general international law conflict rules do not offer conclusive
solutions, especially for the relationship between TRIPS flexibility rules and
TRIPS-plus FTA provisions which undermine their application. This follows
from a narrow definition of conflict which would exclude a priori all tensions
between an optional TRIPS right and a subsequent TRIPS-plus obligation
which takes this right away in a FTA. Also, if one adopts-along the lines of
the ILC report-a wider understanding of conflict, the general conflict
resolution tools do not provide clear answers to the most pressing issues on the
fate of TRIPS flexibilities. The next section therefore looks in detail at the
specific "conflict resolution" clauses in TRIPS and TRIPS-plus FTAs.
III. CONFLICT NoRMS IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
In addition to the conflict rules in general international law, the treaties

74 See, e.g., EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 5, art. 145; Dominican Republic-Central
America-United States Free Trade Agreement PR-CAFTA FTA], Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514.
75 See EU-Colombia-Peru Free Trade Agreement, Art. 196, Mar. 24, 2011 ("The provisions of
this Title shall complement and speafy the rights and obligations of the Parties under the TRIPS
Agreement ..... (emphasis added)).
76 ILC I, supra note 28,
9.

77 Id. 110.
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whose rules potentially clash also may contain relevant conflict rules. Such rules
generally are lex specialis to those of general international law discussed above.78
To the extent such conflict clauses exist in either TRIPS or subsequent FTAs,
they determine the relationship between these treaties. In international IP law,
Article 2:2 TRIPS is an example of a provision which establishes that certain
preexisting multilateral IP treaties prevail over TRIPS in the sense that
provisions in TRIPS Parts I-IV shall not be understood to derogate from
obligations in these pre-existing treaties. 79 While this is a fairly clear-cut rule
governing the relation between TRIPS and the most important pre-TRIPS
multilateral treaties on substantive IP protection, it does not address in any way
the relation between TRIPS and subsequent FTAs with provisions providing
additional IP protection.
The main concept in international IP law which governs the relation
amongst different agreements addressing the same subject matter is that of
"minimum standards."8 0
In principle, subsequent treaties can establish
additional protection for IP, but may not curtail the protection provided for in
earlier treaties. This leads to the often-criticised spiral of ever-increasing levels
of IP protection.8 ' In the second sentence of Article 1:1, TRIPS addresses this
issue of additional protection beyond its own standards. It authorizes members
to grant more extensive protection than TRIPS requires, with the qualification
that such protection "does not contravene the provisions of the Agreement." 82 In
the context addressed here, the primary importance of this qualification lies in
its capacity to establish a condition on the ability to introduce more extensive IP
protection;TRIPS-plus protection must not contravene TRIPS.83
The first question which arises is whether this TRIPS provision can be
understood as a conflict rule between TRIPS and subsequent TRIPS-plus
FTAs. Since Article 1:1 TRIPS directly applies to the ability to implement more
extensive protection in domestic law only, findings of contravention would not

78See Pauwelyn, supra note

27, at 544-45.
In this regard, Article 2:2 TRIPS is a conflict clause on the priority of application of
subsequent treaties in the sense of Article 30:2 VCLT; see Part II.C above.
8 See Part I above.
s1 See Kur & Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 11, at 8-14.
82 TRIPS art. 1:1. In full, the second sentence of Article 1:1 states: "Members may, but shall
not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this
Agreement."
83 For an analysis of this qualification and its implications for the principle of minimum
standards, see Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Time for a ParadigmShft? ExploringMaximum Standards
in InternationalIntellectual Ppery Protection, 1 J. TRADE, L. & DEv. 56 (2009), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract= 1457416.
79
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amount to inconsistency with the TRIPS-plus FTA rule as such. Indirectly,
however, Article 1:1 TRIPS also affects the international plane. While countries
may agree to TRIPS-contravening TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs without
directly violating the wording of Article 1:1 TRIPS, any subsequent domestic
implementation of IP protection which "contravenes" TRIPS provisions would
be inconsistent with TRIPS. In light of this linkage, the notion of pacta sunt
senanda84 should prevent States from agreeing to international obligations
whose implementation would conflict with other treaty obligations-in this case
Article 1:1 TRIPS.
The WTO Director General, Pascal Lamy, also
acknowledged the relevance of Article 1:1 TRIPS for the relationship between
TRIPS and TRIPS-plus FTAs when he referred to this provision to address the
legality of ACTA from a WTO/TRIPS perspective.85 In addition, several
developing countries referred to the TRIPS notion of "non-contravention" in
the TRIPS Council Meeting on June 8-9, 2010.86 On the relation between
TRIPS and TRIPS-plus FTAs, such as ACTA, the Indian Delegate stated:
TRIPS plus measures cannot be justified on the basis of Art 1:1
since the same provision also states that more extensive
protection may only be granted "provided that such protection
does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement." In
addition to laying certain minimum standards, TRIPS Agreement
also provides "ceilings", some of which are mandatory and clearly
specified in the TRIPS Agreement.87
The Chinese delegate equally stressed that, while generally TRIPS establishes
"only minimum standards of IP protection," it also constrains the ability of
WTO Members to foresee more extensive protection-inter alia, by requiring

84 See VCLT, supra note 35, art. 26 ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith.").
85 In a response to Members of the European Parliament which demanded a WTO enquiry
into ACTA, the WTO Director General Pascal Lamy responded by referring to the second
sentence of Article 1:1 TRIPS in order to describe the relation between ACTA and the
WTO/TRIPS Agreement. While Lamy did rely primarily on the general ability of WTO
members to introduce additional IP protection, he also noted the qualification that this is subject
to such protection not "contravening" TRIPS provisions. Letter from Pascal Lamy, Director
General, World Trade Organization, to European Union Parliament Members (May 4, 2010),
available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/WTO-Lamy.Answer-to-MiEP-letter.pdf.
86 See Int'l Center for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Animated TRIPS Council Meeting Tackles Public
Health, ACTA, Biodiversity, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWs DIGEST, June 16, 2010, available at
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/78201 / [hereinafter ICTSD].
87 Intervention by India, Minutes ofthe CoundiforTRIPS Meeing, supranote 8, T 265.
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that "such protection shall not contravene the provisions of TRIPS."88 These
views were shared by delegates from Peru, South Africa, Egypt, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and from other developing countries.89 In sum, there are convincing
arguments in favour of understanding the second sentence of Article 1:1 TRIPS
as the relevant conflict rule concerning any international obligation demanding
additional IP protection.
This leads to the question of when an FTA rule obliging implementation of
TRIPS-plus standards which inhibit or prevent the exercise of flexibilities in
TRIPS "contravenes" the respective TRIPS flexibility provision. Therefore,
one needs to assess which form of additional IP protection has the potential to
"contravene" TRIPS. 90 Without completely excluding other arguments for
findings of contravention,9 1 instances where this qualification of Article 1:1
TRIPS applies are most likely to be found in cases where one can point to
conflicts with a mandatory TRIPS provision instead of an optional one. Can a
TRIPS-plus rule "contravene" optional TRIPS flexibilities-for example, by
mandating levels of IP protection whose implementation inhibits or curtails a
WTO Member's ability to rely on a flexibility foreseen by TRIPS? As argued in
Part II.B above, 92 this is not the case. Any other result contradicts the overall
notion of optional flexibilities in TRIPS: a WTO member may choose to
implement them in its domestic IP laws (i.e., to exercise its right), but may
equally choose not to do so. If a WTO member thus decides to waive its right
to use a certain flexibility which it has under TRIPS, this is equally a way of
exercising its right and part of the flexibility TRIPS provides. Applying the
notion of "contravening" in Article 1:1 TRIPS so as to prevent a WTO
Member from doing so in effect turns the optional rule into a mandatory one. 93
88 Intervention by China, id. 252.

89

ICTSD, supra note 86.
90 For a more detailed analysis of this term, see Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 83, at 67-73.
91 See in particular the idea expressed in ICTSD & UNCTAD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS
AND DEVELOPMENT: AN AUTHORITATIVE AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 24
(2005) that pressure to accept TRIPS-plus standards in FTA negotiations might contravene the
object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and TRIPS to provide a secure framework for the
conduct of international trade relations. On the question of whether political pressure to adopt
TRIPS-plus is relevant in the context of Article 1:1, see below.
92 The discussion in Part II.B deals with the similar question of what constitutes a relevant
"conflict" of norms in the TRIPS-FTA context, while this Part looks at the notion of
"contravening" as a conflict resolution tool.
93 In the discussion on the most appropriate understanding of norm conflict in Part ILB above,
strategic arguments in favor of a wide definition of conflict may call for a different result in order
not to exclude a priori the relation between TRIPS flexibilities and TRIPS-plus FTA rules from
further conflict analysis. In the end, however, when assessing which provisions actually prevail in
this relationship, the arguments in favor of a wide definition of "conflict" have no bearing on the
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These findings remain valid even when the domestic TRIPS-plus rule results
from an FTA imposing TRIPS-plus obligations. While most (developing)
countries agree to such obligations only in order to obtain preferential market
access concessions in areas of their interests, they also consent formally to the
IP obligations which are often conditio sine qua non for the preferential treatment
they strive for. This assessment does not ignore the political bargaining and use
of economic might by dominant trade powers and the consequence that
94
It seems very
countries are often "bullied" into signing TRIPS-plus FTAs.
law to
international
in
conflict
norm
of
notions
the
on
to
rely
however,
difficult,
best
perceived
(or
will"
"free
the
safeguard
or
to
process
interfere in this
95
flexibilities.
TRIPS
uphold
to
in
order
interests) of developing WTO Members
In this regard, the phrase in the second sentence of Article 1:1 TRIPS, which
states that WTO Members "may, but shall not be obliged to" introduce additional
96
IP protection beyond TRIPS, also is arguably of limited help. While it may
serve as a tool against unilateral pressure to adopt TRIPS-plus IP protection,
pressure tactics in bilateral negotiations will be unlikely to suffice if, in the end,
there is a formal agreement signed between the parties. Given that these FTAs
are the result of reciprocal concessions, however "unfair" and uneven they may
be, international law (unfortunately) does not have the appropriate tools to
undo the uneven political and economic positions in the negotiation of
international treaties.
The "non-contravention" qualification in the second sentence of Article 1:1
TRIPS hence cannot function to safeguard TRIPS flexibilities for WTO
Members who decide not to exercise them. Since a TRIPS-plus rule in national
law thus does not contravene an (optional) TRIPS flexibility norm, the conflict
resolution rule in Article 1:1 TRIPS does not prevent, but allows obligations in
TRIPS-plus FTAs to curtail a WTO Member's ability to exercise these

appropriate understanding of the TRIPS notion of "contravene" in Article 1:1, 2nd sentence of
TRIPS. They therefore cannot affect the analysis in this section.
94 See Drahos,supra note 6; PEDRO ROFFE, BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUs WORLD:
THE CHILE-USA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (2004), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/
economic/Issues/Bilateral-Agreements-and-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf; Susan K. Sell, Industy Strateges
for IntellectualPropertj and Trade: The Questfor TRIPs and Post-TRIPs Strateges, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 79 (2002).
95 By analogy to notions in private law to protect the weaker party (consumers, employees,
tenants), one could instead think about extending the (international) law of treaties to address
such issues. In the end, however, in the absence of a central authority in international relations
between countries, international law is not the all-powerful tool to prevent political pressure and
the exercise of economic might.
96 TRIPS art. 1:1 (emphasis added). For a comprehensive discussion on this issue, see NUNO
PIREs DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 107-13 (3d ed. 2010).
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flexibilities. Only where a TRIPS-plus rule conflicts with binding limits or
"ceilings" to additional protection in TRIPS does it "contravene" TRIPS
provisions so that, under Article 1:1 TRIPS, the TRIPS maximum standard
prevails in application.97 In sum, from the perspective of TRIPS, TRIPS-plus
FTAs may certainly triumph over TRIPS flexibilities.
IV. CONFLICT NORMS IN TRIPS-PLUS FTAS

The final body of rules in which to look for a relevant conflict norm is the
general and IP-specific provisions in FTAs. On the one hand, TRIPS-plus
FTAs often contain provisions which undermine or limit the ability of the
contracting WTO Members to use the policy space provided by TRIPS. On the
other, especially the newer generation of U.S. and EU FTAs contain clauses
which may function to safeguard some of the TRIPS flexibilities. Again, the
question arises whether these provisions-understood as conflict clauses-lead
TRIPS flexibilities to prevail over TRIPS-plus FTA provisions to the extent
they are in conflict. In the relation between the FTA parties, these conflict
clauses are lex speialis to the general rule in Article 1:1 TRIPS. If their
application does safeguard TRIPS flexibilities, this result in turn arguably
prevails over the one flowing from the application of the more general TRIPS
conflict norm.98 In the following section, these FTA provisions are divided into
several groups based on how they define the relation to TRIPS or specific
TRIPS flexibilities.
A. AFFIRMING WTO/TRIPS (RIGHTS AND) OBLIGATIONS

The first and most traditional group of conflict clauses generally affirm the
parties' intentions to act consistent with WTO obligations in general or with
those deriving from TRIPS in particular. In most instances, this affirmation
also extends to "rights" granted under the WTO/TRIPS Agreements.
A prominent example where the conflict rule refers to WTO/TRIPS
obligationsonly is Article 1 ACTA which states: "Nothing in this Agreement shall
derogate from any international obligation of a Party with respect to any other
Party under existing agreements to which both Parties are party, including the
TRIPS Agreement.""
First and foremost, ACTA hence would have to be
interpreted in a manner consistent with TRIPS. If that is not possible, the
97 Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 83, at 73.
98 On the operation of the lex specialis principle to determine priority in application of the more
specific rule (and its limitations), see Part III.C.
9 ACTA, supra note 39, art. 1.
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ACTA draft expresses the intention of the negotiating parties not to derogate
from any WTO/TRIPS obligations. Interestingly, the final ACTA text uses
only the term "obligations"-not "rights and obligations" as earlier versions of
ACTA did. 00 This indicates that-from its own perspective-ACTA prevails
over optional TRIPS flexibilities. The same result applies to other conflict
01
clauses which only refer to obligations owed under TRIPS.
However, in all U.S. FTAs examined for this research, the conflict clause
concerns both nghts and obligations under WTO / TRIPS. The contracting
parties usually include a general provision where they assert "existing rights and
obligations with respect to each other under existing bilateral and multilateral
02
agreements to which both Parties are party, including the WTO Agreement."1
In addition, in an IP-specific rule in some FTAs the "parties affirm their rights
03
and obligations with respect to each other under the TRIPS Agreement."
Similarly, some clauses used in EU FTAs refer to both "rights and obligations
04
Also, most Japanese
between the Parties under the TRIPS Agreement."1

100Based on the July ACTA text, Article 1 "Relation To Other Agreements" stated that
"nothing in this Agreement shall derogate from [N.Z./Sing./EU: any existing rights and] any
obligation of a party with respect to any other Party under existing agreements, including the
WTO Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights." ACTA-July 1, 2010
Consolidated Text: Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, Art. 1.1, available at http://sites.go
ogle.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow "Consolidated ACTA Text, July 1, 2010" hyperlink).
In the ACTA draft leaked after the Washington D.C. round of negotiations in the end of August
2010, however, Article 1.1 had again been changed to refer only to "obligations." ACTA-August
25, 2010 Consolidated Text: Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, Art. 1.1, available at
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow "Full Leaked Text Dated August 25,
2010" hyperlink), Art.1:1, at p. 3; Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 40, at 63-65.
101 See, e.g., EU-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 5, art. 139.1; EU-Chile Association Agreement
Art. 170.1(a)(i), Nov. 18, 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 352) 3 (expressing intention of the contracting parties
to "[e]nsure adequate and effective implementation of the obligations arising from . .. TRIPS").
102 United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Art. 1.1(2), May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026;
U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 46, art. 1.1(2); United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement Art.
1.2(1), Sept. 14, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544; United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement Art. 1.2(1),
June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544; United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement Art. 1.2(1), Jan. 19,
2006; United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement Art. 1.2, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63; DRCAFTA, supra note 74, art. 1.3(1); United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement Art.1.3(1),
June 28, 2007; United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Art. 1.3, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026;
United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Art. 1.2, Nov. 22, 2006; United StatesKorea Free Trade Agreement Art. 1.2(1), June 30, 2007; United States-Peru Trade Promotion
Agreement Art. 1.2(1), Apr. 12, 2006.
103 See, e.g., U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 46, art. 17.1(3); DR-CAFTA, supra note 74,
art. 15.1(7); U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 102, arts. 17.1(5), 1.3, ch. 17 (IP) pmbl. ("nothing shall
derogate from"); U.S.-Colombia TPA, supra note 102, art. 16.1(6); U.S.-Korea FTA, supra
note 102, art. 18.1(2).
104 See, e.g., EU-Colombia-Peru FTA, supranote 75, art. 186(1).
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FTAs contain such a clause-however, often with the addition that "[i]n the
event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the WTO Agreement,
the WTO Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency."' 0 5 Again,
the question arises whether such explicit conflict clauses, as well as the further
inclusion of treaty rights under WNITO/TRIPS Agreements, can function to
safeguard TRIPS flexibilities as far as their operation is undermined by TRIPSplus FTA provisions.
First, the
For the following reasons, however, this seems unlikely.
contracting parties may understand the term "rights and obligations" with
respect to each other as describing a (treaty) obligation in international law from
a dual perspective where the obligation of one party is a right of another
party.106 Then the term would still apply only to obligations in international
(treaty) law and not as a safeguard for TRIPS flexibilities as optional treaty
rights. Second, even if one considers that the term "rights" applies to TRIPS
flexibilities, it is limited to rights which the FTA parties owe to another. If
these countries decide to waive rights (by not exercising certain TRIPS
flexibilities), then any TRIPS-plus FTA provision which undermines the use of
such a flexibility would arguably not derogate from a treaty right affirmed in
these conflict clauses. This argument also applies to the explicit conflict clauses
in most Japanese FTAs which give preference to the WTO Agreement to the
extent of any inconsistency with the FTA; inconsistency with TRIPS (as an
agreement annexed to the WTO Agreement) does not exist where the
contracting parties agree not to exercise a right under TRIPS. Finally, as far as
FTAs contain specific TRIPS-plus rules whose interpretation necessarily leads
to an outcome that undermines the exercise of TRIPS flexibilities, the operation
of the conflict rules described above cannot lead to a result which renders the
specific TRIPS-plus provision inutile or ineffective. 07 It thus remains rather

105 See, e.g., Japan-Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement Art. 12, Aug. 20, 2007; JapanThailand Economic Partnership Agreement Art. 11, Apr. 3, 2007; Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement Art. 11, Sept. 9, 2006; Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement
Art. 11, Dec. 13, 2005;Japan-Vietnam Economic Partnership Agreement Art. 9, Dec. 12, 2008.
106 For example, the obligation not to introduce a system of international exhaustion in the
domestic law of one contracting party can be viewed as a right of the other contracting party to
demand that no such system of exhaustion is provided in domestic law.
107 This follows from the application of the principle of good faith in treaty interpretation (as
embodied in VCLT, supra note 35, art. 31(1)) which is inter alia an expression of the principle of
pacta sunt servanda (id. art. 26) that in turn embodies the principle of effectiveness. See [1996] 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 219, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1966/Add.1, and IAN SINCLAIR, THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 119-20 (2d ed. 1984). Notions of good faith

and of giving effect to each provision of the treaty prohibit an interpretation of one treaty
provision which renders another treaty provision ineffective or inutile. See also Appellate Body
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doubtful that the FTA clauses simply affirming "rights and obligations" can
operate to prevent specific TRIPS-plus rules in FTAs from undermining TRIPS
Only where TRIPS-plus provisions are open-textured or
flexibilities.
ambiguous in their impact on TRIPS can such conflict clauses demand an
interpretation which safeguards TRIPS flexibilities.10s In sum, these traditional
FTA conflict clauses cannot be applied to uphold an optional provision in
TRIPS which the IP Chapter provisions of that very same FTA override.
B. REFERENCES TO THE DOHA DECLARATION

Another type of provision that appears in the more recent U.S. and EU
FTAs contains various types of references to the Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health.109 Since the Doha Declaration in paragraph 5 lists some of
the most important flexibilities that TRIPS contains in relation to public health
matters in particular,IO such provisions could function to uphold these
flexibilities over TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs.
The first category of "Doha-references" are of a general nature. The FTA
contracting parties "recogni[se] the principles set out in,"111 "affirm their
commitment to," 112 or "recognise the importance of"'1 13 the Doha Declaration.
In the same vein, in the ACTA preamble, the negotiating parties agree to ACTA
while: "Recognizing the principles set out in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, adopted on November 14, 2001, by the WTO at
the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Doha, Qatar." 114 The
principles expressed in the Doha Declaration concern, inter alia, a public health-

Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, N 121
WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998).
100 This result, however, already follows from the principle of harmonious interpretation as
discussed in Part II supra. The same is true for the more specific EU-Colombia-Peru FTA, supra
note 75, art. 196(2), which further provides "[tlhe provisions of this Title shall complement and
specify the rights and obligations of the Parties under the TRIPS Agreement and other
multilateral agreements related to intellectual property to which the Parties are party, and
therefore, no provision of this Title will contradict or be detrimental to the povisions of such multilateral
agreements." (emphasis added). Apart from expressing the principle of lex speialis, the provision
calls-to the extent possible-for a harmonious interpretation which takes TRIPS flexibilities
into account.
109 Doha Declaration, supra note 7.
110 See Part I above.
"I U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 102, pmbl. to ch. 17.
112 U.S--Colombia TPA, supra note 102, art. 16.13.1; U.S.-Peru TPA, supra note 102, art.
16.13:1; U.S.-Korea FTA, supra note 102, art. 18.11.1.
113 EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 5, art. 147(b).
114 ACTA, supra note 39, pmbl.
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In making this
supportive interpretation and implementation of TRIPS."1
connection, WTO Members reaffirmed "the right of WTO Members to use, to
the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for
this purpose."" 6 Hence, such general references to the Doha Declaration in
FTAs can function primarily as a tool which demands an interpretation and
implementation of FTA provisions that does not undermine the flexibilities listed
in the Doha Declaration. Similar to the WTO/TRIPS consistency clauses
discussed above, this may work well in cases of open-textured and ambiguous
TRIPS-plus obligations in FTAs." 7 However, it will not be particularly helpful
in the vast number of cases where specific and concise TRIPS-plus provisions
8
in FTAs curtail or inhibit the reliance on TRIPS flexibilities."
A more promising clause is Article 197:2 of the EU-Colombia-Peru FTA
which states:
The Parties recognize the importance of the [Doha Declaration]
and especially the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, adopted on 14 November 2001 by the
Ministerial Conference and its subsequent developments. In this
sense, in interpretingand implementing the rights and obligations under this
Title, the Partiesshall ensure consisteng with this Declaration."9
Again, it emphasizes interpretation and implementation of the FTA as the
primary field of operation for "recognising" the importance of the Doha
Declaration for the FTA. However, beyond the general Doha-references
discussed above, the parties are under a binding legal obligation to "ensure
consistency" with the Doha Declaration. How can this be aligned with specific
TRIPS-plus FTA obligations in case they undermine the use of any of the
flexibilities listed in the Doha Declaration? An example of such a contradiction
is Article 231 of the EU-Peru-Colombia FTA, which demands a minimum of
115 Doha Declaration, supra note 7,
4 (stating that TRIPS "can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all").
116 Id
117 For an example of such an interpretation (there in relation to the term "exceptional
circumstances" in Article 18 ACTA), see Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 40, at 37-41.
118 As argued in Part 1, general conflict clauses in FTAs, including these general references to
the Doha Declaration, cannot lead to a result which renders the specific TRIPS-plus FTA
provisions inutile or ineffective.
119 EU-Colombia-Peru FTA, supra note 75, art. 197(2) (emphasis added); see also Draft EUIndia FTA Text, art. 13.2(2), available at http://cis-india.org/advocacy/ipr/upload/india-eu-fta-ip
r-july-201 0/at-download/file.
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five years of test data exclusivity for pharmaceutical products.120 This TRIPSplus rule can prevent Peru or Colombia from effectively exercising the
compulsory licensing flexibilities set out in the Doha Declaration. Such
flexibilities-allowing states to determine freely the grounds for compulsory
licenses-are de facto useless when, based on test data exclusivity, no generic
production can take place to improve affordable access to medicines. To
resolve this conflict, the Doha-reference in Article 197:2 should be understood
to allow a wider understanding of the "[e]xceptions for reasons of public
interest, situations of national emergency or extreme urgency, when it is
necessary to allow access to those data to third parties" foreseen in
Article 231:4.121 To live up to the obligation to "ensure consistency" with the
Doha Declaration, these exceptions must allow a real and effective use of all the
TRIPS flexibilities mentioned in the Doha Declaration.122 In sum, the added
value of Doha-references-such as Article 197:2 of the EU-Colombia-Peru
FTA-is that they are more concrete and specific in indicating how the Doha
Declaration is relevant for the FTA. They are hence more effective in
safeguarding TRIPS flexibilities because they have a greater impact on the
Since even a
appropriate understanding of TRIPS-plus FTA provisions.
concise and detailed TRIPS-plus provision in an FTA will seldom explicitly
prohibit reliance on any of the four TRIPS flexibilities mentioned in the Doha
Declaration, FTA provisions may not undermine those flexibilities.
Yet another category of Doha-references in FTAs appear particularly
promising at first sight. They allow that "a Party may take measures to protect
public health in accordance with ... the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health." 123 However, this is "[n]otwithstanding subparagraphs (a),
(b), and (c)" of the relevant TRIPS-plus FTA rule, which in essence oblige the
FTA contracting parties to introduce a "reasonable period" of test data
exclusivity. That normally is to be understood as five years.124 Hence the right
to rely on TRIPS flexibilities which flows from these Doha-references is subject
to the obligation not to interfere with the specific obligation to introduce test
data exclusivity. Since the contextual placement of the Doha reference in the
EU-Colombia-Peru FTA, supra note 75, art. 231(2).
Id.
122 In the context of the EU-India FTA, the EU Commission confirms this result by assuring
that "[d]ata exclusivity will not hamper the effective use of a compulsory licence....More
specifically, in case of conflict between data exclusivity rules and compulsory licensing, the latter
would override the former." See EU Comm'n, supra note 20, 1 4.
123 See U.S.-Colombia TPA, supra note 102, art. 16 .10:2(e); U.S.-Peru TPA, supra note 102,
2
art. 16.10: (e); U.S.-Korea FTA, supranote 102, art. 18.g:3.
124 See U.S.-Colombia TPA, supra note 102, art. 16.10:2(b); U.S.-Peru TPA, supra note 102,
art. 16.10:2(b); U.S.-Korea FTA, supra note 102, art. 18.g-.2.
120

121
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last subparagraph of the test data provision indicates that it only applies to this
provision, one may question what independent value it can have after all. One
could interpret the "notwithstanding test" in a way that any measure taken
cannot affect the protection for test data at all. A more liberal reading,
however, would allow taking any measure in accordance with the Doha
Declaration (e.g., a compulsory license based on Article 31 TRIPS) as long it is
within the interpretative boundaries of the provision on test data. Here, a wider
understanding of "reasonable period" and "normally" could allow compulsory
licenses for a patented drug as an exceptional, public health-motivated situation
which does not interfere with the "reasonable" test data exclusivity period.
Again, appropriate solutions depend heavily on an implementation and
interpretation which adopts creative ways to give effect to the Doha-references.
Finally, some of the recent FTAs contain language which is similar or
identical to parts of the Doha Declaration. For example, a section in the
"Understanding Regarding Certain Public Health Measures" in several recent
U.S. FTAs states:
The obligationsof this Chapterdo not and should not prevent a Paryfrom
taking measures to protect public health by promoting access to
medicines for all, in particular concerning cases such as
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics as well as
circumstances of extreme urgency or national emergency.
Accordingly, while reiterating their commitment to this Chapter, the Parties
affirm that this Chaptercan and should be intepretedand implemented in a
manner supportive of each Pary's right to protect public health and, in
particular,to promote access to medicinesfor all.125
In a similar manner, Article 139:2 of the EC-CARIFORUM EPA assures
that "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as to impair the capacity of
the Parties and the Signatory CARIFORUM States to promote access to
medicines."1 26 A detailed analysis of the implications of these provisions is well
beyond the scope of this Article.127 Compared to the Doha-references, they

125 U.S.-Colombia TPA, srpra note 102, art. 16.13:2; U.S.-Peru TPA, supra note 102, art.
16.13:2; U.S.-Korea FTA, supra note 102, art. 18.13:2 (emphasis added) which are, in the
emphasized parts, almost identical to para. 4 of the Doha Declaration, supra note 7.
126 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 5, art. 139(2), which also has the same core meaning as
para. 4 of the Doha Declaration.
127 For a more detailed analysis of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, article 139:2, see Henning
Grosse Ruse-Khan, The Concept of Sustainable Development in IntemationalIP Law - New Approaches
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reiterate important principles of the Doha Declaration and transplant them into
the FTA context instead of indirectly referring to them or to the flexibilities
mentioned in the Declaration. While this may.be less effective for safeguarding
these flexibilities against TRIPS-plus FTA provisions, the Doha-language
transplanted here can have an even further-reaching impact on the FTA
obligations. It may entail a right of the contracting parties to adopt public
health or nutrition protecting measures--even if these measures are
inconsistent with individual IP obligations in the FTA. Or, it may mean that
such individual obligations must be interpretedand implemented in a way that allows
domestic measures to protect public health and nutrition. Given the reference
to interpretation and implementation as the means for ensuring the right to
protect public health in the U.S. FTA quote above, the latter option appears
preferable. Also, for the EU EPA provision, its title ("Nature and Scope of
Obligations") 128 speaks to an interpretative function for that provision. The
nature and scope of individual IP obligations in the EPA must be such that they
allow the protection of public health and nutrition and must not impair access
to medicines. 129
In sum, the various types of Doha-references in FTAs can go a certain way
to safeguarding TRIPS flexibilities. The extent to which they can perform such
a safeguarding function depends on the type of reference at hand. In general,
the main feature of the Doha Declaration that allows the creation of policy
space within TRIPS-mainly by interpretation and implementation 30-equally
affects the role Doha-references can play in TRIPS-plus FTAs. They function
primarily as a tool which demands an interpretation and implementation of
FTA provisions that does not undermine the flexibilities listed in the Doha
Declaration.
Doha references thus guide the notion of "harmonious
interpretation" towards an understanding which recognises TRIPS flexibilities.
The more specific the TRIPS-plus obligations in FTAs are, however, the fewer
the options are for such an interpretative approach. On the other hand, the
more specifically and demandingly a clause refers to the Doha Declaration, the
more effective it is in safeguarding TRIPS flexibilities.
Beyond its role as a potential safeguard for TRIPS flexibilities, another
important effect of the Doha-references is that they establish a (legal)
relationship between the Doha Declaration and the FTA IP provisions.
Depending on the type of Doha reference, this is instrumental in clarifying the
from EU Economic Partnershzi Agreements?, MAX

PLANCK PAPER SERIES ON INTELL. PROP., COMP. &

TAX L. 10-04, 22-24, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542486.
128 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, supranote 5, art. 139(2).
129 Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 127, at 23.
130 Doha Declaration, supra note 7, T 4.
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legal status of the Doha Declaration as an interpretative instrument, as well as a
source of law in its own right.'1' Again, the more concretely and specifically an
FTA refers to the Doha Declaration, the greater will be its relevance for the
interpretation of the FTA IP provisions. Furthermore, those FTAs which
transplant parts of the Doha Declaration into the FTA treaty text "internalise"
and integrate the Doha Declaration, allowing it to become part of treaty law.
The Doha Declaration hence is upgraded from a mere source of external
guidance (relevant for interpretation)132 to being a part of the treaty provisions.
As part of treaty law, it is part of the treaty's rights and obligations and can
therefore have a greater and more direct impact on IP obligations in FTAs.133
C. REFERENCES TO (SPECIFIC) TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES

The third and final category of rules examined here are those which refer to
specific TRIPS provisions that offer policy space or to TRIPS flexibilities in
general. A good example of the latter category is Article 197:1 of the EUPeru-Colombia FTA which states:
Having regard for the provisions of this Title, each Party may, in
formulating or amending its laws and regulations, make use of the
exceptions andflexibilitiespermitted by the multilateralintellectualproperty
agreements, particularly when adopting measures necessary to
protect public health and nutrition, and to guarantee access to
medicines.134
The text highlighted in italics gives the impression that Article 197:1 allows
the FTA parties to rely on exceptions and flexibilities permitted by any
multilateral IP treaty-including TRIPS. Although the provision contains

131On the debate about the legal status of the Doha Declaration, see Frederick Abbot, The
Doba Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WITO, 5 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 469, 491-92 (2002); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Proportionality and Balancing
within the Objectives ofIntellectual Propery Protection,in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
161, 184 (P. Torremanns ed., 2008). See generally Steve Charnovitz, The Legal Status of the Doha
Dedaration, 5 J. INT'L ECoN. L. 207 (2002).
132 In the context of TRIPS, the Doha Declaration should be understood as a "subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions" in the sense of Article 31:3(a) VCLT which hence "shall be taken into account,
together with the context" in the process of TRIPS interpretation. Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra
note 131, at 184.
133 Thanks to Margaret Chon for emphasising this point.
134 EU-Columbia-Peru FTA, supra note 75 (emphasis added).
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several ambiguities (what constitutes an "exception"-and, more importantly,
what is a "flexibility"?), this fact arguably works in favor of the FTA party
The absence of any definition of the term
invoking this provision.
"flexibilities" allows each party significant discretion to rely on almost any
provision in an international IP agreement which offers more policy space than
the FTA provisions. Against this background, the chapeau clause "[h]aving
regard for the provisions of this Title" functions to limit the policy space in
relying on anything understood as a "flexibility" in international IP law. Making
use of TRIPS flexibilities hence cannot override TRIPS-plus clauses in the FTA.
This means that, where FTA provisions contain detailed and concrete
obligations to protect IP rights, they prevail over the permission to rely on
exceptions and flexibilities to the extent of a conflict. However, it also means
that, where those obligations are ambiguous or of general nature, they must be
interpreted in light of the right to rely on (TRIPS) flexibilities.135 Wherever
possible, provisions like Article 197:1 thus allow an interpretation and
implementation of the FTA obligations that aligns with the existing exceptions
and flexibilities in multilateral IP treaties.
A similar approach is taken in Article 17.4:10(c) of the U.S.-Australia FTA,
which allows the contracting parties to rely on exceptions and limitations under
TRIPS and other international IP treaties.136 It provides: "unless otherwise
specifically provided in this Chapter, nothing in this Article shall be construed
as reducing or extending the scope of applicability of the limitations and
exceptions permitted under the agreements referred to in Articles 17.1.2 and
17.1.4 and the TRIPS Agreement."1 37 The impact of this provision is, however,
more limited. First, it applies only to copyright protection obligations in Article
17.4 of the FTA. Second, it refers to exceptions and limitations only-not to
the broader notion of flexibilities. Article 17.4:10(c) hence merely allows states
to rely on copyright exceptions and limitations contained in, interalia, the Berne
Convention and TRIPS-and only to the extent that the FTA IP chapter does
not specifically provide otherwise. Since the latter is the case particularly for
exceptions to the protection of technological protection measures and digital
rights management information,138 its practical importance is rather limited.
Another example is Article 15 of the Draft EU-India FTA stating that
"[e]ach Party in its laws and regulations shall provide for protection of
135 See also the arguments concerning the EU-Columbia-Peru FTA, made in Part III above,
which are to the same effect as those made in relation to the Doha-reference in Article 197:2 of
the same EU-Colombia-Peru FTA.
136 U.S.-Australia FTA, supranote 46, art. 17.4:10(c).
137

138

Id.
Id art. 17.4(7)(e), (f), (8)(b).
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undisclosed information in accordance with and subject to the flexibilities in the TRIPS
agreement."139 Again, the field of operation for this clause is limited because it
applies only to the protection of undisclosed information. The obligation to
provide for this form of IP protection, however, is made subject to the right to
rely on TRIPS flexibilities.1 40 It means that, for example, the protection of test
data submitted for the purpose of obtaining marketing approval for
pharmaceutical products cannot interfere with the public health-related
flexibilities of TRIPS-such as the right to grant compulsory licenses. In order
to give effect to this clause, it should be further understood that patent-related
flexibilities in TRIPS impose limits to the protection of undisclosed information
The EU
and that the latter cannot make the former meaningless.141
Commission has confirmed such an interpretation in a Question and Answer
paper on the EU-India FIA to allay fears and concerns expressed by civil
society groups over the impact that FTA might have on access to medicines in
India and other developing countries which rely on India for affordable
medicines. The paper states:
Data exclusivity will not hamper the effective use of a
compulsory licence. The EU has proposed a clause that will
guarantee that no provision of the FTA will prevent India from
using the flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement. More
specifically, in case of conflict between data exclusivity rules and
42
compulsory licensing, the latter would override the former.1
ACTA offers another, different example of clauses referring to TRIPS
flexibilities. Its Article 2:3 (nature and scope of obligations) states: "The
objectives and principles set forth in Part I of the TRIPS Agreement, in
particular in Articles 7 and 8, shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to this Agreement."1 43
While the reference to Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS is a reference to specific TRIPS
provisions, those are primarily relevant for a public interest based interpretation
and implementation of other TRIPS provisions.'" Since the objectives and
See EU-India FTA Draft, supranote 119, art. 15.
A more narrow reading of this provision would merely refer to the flexibilities inherent in
the TRIPS provision on protecting undisclosed information (Article 39), in particular the
discretion to define what amounts to "unfair commercial use" under Article 39:3 TRIPS.
141 This follows from the principle of effectiveness (effet utile) as embodied in the notion of
"good faith" in Article 31:1 VCLT; see alo supra note 107 and accompanying references.
142 See EU Comm'n, supranote 20, 1 4.
143 ACTA, supra note 39, art. 2:3.
144 See Doha Declaration, supra note 7, T 5(a) (emphasizing the role of Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS
for treaty interpretation: "In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international
139

143

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss2/2

36

Ruse-Khan: The International Law Relation Between TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS
2011]

SAFEGUARDING TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES?

361

principles embodied in Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS apply horizontally to all TRIPS
obligations, their application via reference in ACTA equally affects the
understanding of all ACTA provisions. 145 The fact that Article 2 ACTA defines
the "nature and scope of obligations"'46 in ACTA further underlines this. The
nature and scope of ACTA obligations is, inter alia, determined by an
interpretation and implementation based on the principles and objectives
embodied in Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS. In sum, the reference to Articles 7 and 8
TRIPS within ACTA can have important consequences for those ACTA parties
willing to implement ACTA based on the balancing objectives and public
interest principles embodied in those TRIPS provisions. Their main effect will
again be on open-textured and ambiguous provisions in ACTA-while it is less
likely to have an impact on most of the concise and detailed TRIPS-plus
provisions. 147
While these more general references to exceptions and flexibilities stem
primarily from the newer generation of EU FTAs, some U.S. FTAs also contain
references to specific TRIPS flexibilities. In relation to the scope of patentable
subject matter, the U.S.-CAFTA DR, U.S.-Colombia FTA, and U.S.-Peru TPA
all contain the following clause:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party
from excluding inventions from patentability as set out in Articles
27.2 and 27.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, any Party that does not provide patent protection for
plants by the date of entry into force of this Agreement shall
undertake all reasonable efforts to make such patent protection
available. Any Party that provides patent protection for plants or

law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose
of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles."); see also Grosse
Ruse-Khan, supra note 131, at 181-83. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Priniples of the
TRIPs Agreement, 46 HouSTON L. REv. 979 (2009).
145 Since the ACTA Preamble refers to the Doha Declaration, one can safely conclude that the
role paragraph 5(a) of the Doha Declaration foresees for Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS also applies for
ACTA. For a detailed analysis, see Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 40, at 37-41.
146 Article 2 ACTA has as its title: "Nature and Scope of Obligations."
147 For a more detailed analysis on the impact of Article 2:3 ACTA on the interpretation of
ACTA and its role in achieving coherence between TRIPS and ACTA, see Grosse Ruse-Khan,
supra note 40, at 37-41, 56-58.
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animals on or after the date of entry into force of this Agreement
shall maintain such protection.148
The first sentence clarifies that the IP FTA obligations shall not be
understood in a way that affects the flexibilities in Articles 27:2-3 TRIPS to
exclude certain inventions from patentability. The right to exercise these
flexibilities hence prevails over any TRIPS-plus provisions which might suggest
otherwise. Where such provisions exist, they would have to be interpreted in a
manner which allows reliance on Articles 27:2-3 TRIPS. The language used in
the first sentence thus appears to be an effective way to safeguard (specific)
TRIPS flexibilities. However, sentences 2 and 3 qualify the right to rely on
Articles 27:2-3 TRIPS. Regarding the patentability of plants, the contracting
parties must "undertake all reasonable efforts" to foresee such protection in
their national laws. Legally, this does not seem to affect the safeguard in the
first sentence in a meaningful way. FTA parties should be able to decide
autonomously what "reasonable efforts" they undertake, and they could
arguably use internal opposition as an excuse for not (yet) providing patents for
plants. The more decisive qualification is contained in the third sentence,
whereby any FTA party that already foresees patents for plants or animals must
maintain this level of protection. This "freezes" domestic TRIPS-plus laws and
does not allow FTA parties to rely on the flexibilities in Articles 27:2-3 TRIPS
to change their law. Such "freeze-clauses" thus prevent countries from
exercising existing flexibilities to adapt their IP system to the changing
economic, technological, and societal context.
Further examples of FTA clauses upholding specific TRIPS flexibilities can
be found in basically all investment chapters of U.S. FTAs.149 They relate
primarily to prohibitions of expropriation and technology transfer requirements
and define the relation of those general investment protection standards to
specific exceptions and limitations allowed under TRIPS.150
Identical
148 See DR-CAFTA, supra note 74, art. 15.9; U.S.-Colombia TPA, supra note 102, art. 16.9(2);
U.S.-Peru (TPA), supra note 102, art. 16.9(2).
149 See U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 102, arts. 10.6:5, 10.8:3(b)(i); U.S.-Oman FTA, supra
note 102, arts. 10.6:5, 10.8:3(b)(i); U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 46, arts. 11.5:7, ll.g:3(b)(i);
U.S.-Singapore FTA, supra note 102, arts. 15.6:5, 15.8:3(b)(i); CAFTA-DR, supra note 74,
arts. 10.7:5, 10.9:3(b)(i); U.S.-Panama TPA, supra note 102, arts. 10.7:5, 10.g:3(b)(i); U.S.-Chile
TPA, supra note 102, arts. 10.g:5, 10.5:3(b)(i); U.S.-Colombia TPA, supra note 102, arts. 10.7:5,
10.9:3(b)(i); U.S.-Peru TPA, supra note 102, arts. 10.7:5, 10.g:3(b)(i); U.S.-Korea FTA, supra
note 102, arts. 11.6:5, 11.8:3(b)(i); see also Japan - Chile Economic Partnership Agreement,
March 27, 2007, art. 82.5.
150 The standard provision on expropriation states that it "does not apply to the issuance ofcompulsory
licenses granted in relation to intellectualproperty rights in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, or to the
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provisions exist in the 2004 U.S. Model for a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)
and in recent U.S. BITs.151 These clauses can ensure that investment
standards-especially relating to (indirect) expropriation--do not interfere with
the exercise of TRIPS flexibilities. 152
In sum, references to TRIPS flexibilities are often "subject to" TRIPS-plus
FTA obligations which limit their application and hence their ability to
safeguard the flexibilities declared applicable. In cases of generalreferences, their
main role is to ensure-to the extent possible-coherence between TRIPS-plus
FTA obligations and the right to use TRIPS flexibilities. Their effectiveness as
a TRIPS flexibility safeguard is significantly enhanced where TRIPS-plus
obligations are made "subject to" the right to use TRIPS flexibilities. Instead of
limiting the operation of the reference-clause by the TRIPS-plus obligations in
the FTA, such obligations then are limited by TRIPS flexibilities. Spedfic
references in turn are more likely to allow the referenced flexibility to prevail
over TRIPS-plus FTA obligations. Most effective are clauses referring to
specific TRIPS flexibilities in such a way that "nothing in the FTA IP
provisions shall be construed to prevent" an FTA party from relying on a
specific TRIPS provision. Another, more general implication of these specific
revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance,
revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with Chapter Seventeen (Intellectual Property
The
Rights)" (emphasis added). See, e.g., DR-CAFTA FTA, supra note 74, art. 10.7(5).
prohibition against imposing certain technology or other proprietary knowledge transfer
conditions usually does not apply "when a Party authorizes use of an intellectual property right in
accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, and to measures requiring the disclosure of
proprietary information that fall within the scope of, and are consistent with, Article 39 of the
TRIPS Agreement." See U.S.-Singapore FTA, supra note 102, art. 15.8(3)(b)(i).
151 See U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty [BIT] (2004), available at http://www.bilaterals.
org/IMG/doc/2004 update_ US-modeLBIT.doc [hereinafter BIT]. Accordingly, the standards
on expropriation do "not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to
intellectual property rights in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement." Under recent BITs, this
type of safeguard clause extends further to cover not only compulsory licenses, but also "the
revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance,
revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement." United StatesUruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty Art. 6(5), Nov. 4, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 268; United StatesRwanda Bilateral Investment Treaty Art. 6(5), Feb. 19, 2008.
152 But these clauses allow investors to raise the issue of TRIPS consistency in investor-state
arbitration. Distinct to the WTO dispute settlement system, private parties therefore can
challenge the compliance of domestic laws with the TRIPS Agreement in front of international
(quasi)judicial bodies. This implies a significant departure from the WTO/TRIPS system which
in turn challenges the substantive coherence established by these consistency clauses in the first
place; for a detailed discussion, see Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Protecting IntellectualPperty Under
BITS, FTAs and TRIPS: Confictng Regimes or Mutual Coherence?, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT
TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION (K. Miles & C. Brown eds. forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1757724.
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references is that they can operate to integrate the referred-to flexibility into the
FTA. Similar to the references to the Doha Declaration, the TRIPS flexibility
then becomes part of the treaty's rights and obligations and can therefore have
a greater and more direct impact on IP obligations in FTAs.
V. CONCLUSIONS

This Article has attempted to answer the question whether, based on the
international law concepts which define the relationships between different
treaty rules, TRIPS flexibilities prevail over TRIPS-plus obligations in FTAs.
The political assurances and commitments made by those demanding FTAs
sound promising in this regard. However, they do not live up to the legal reality
in cases where FTA provisions contain (explicit) limitations to something TRIPS
(sometimes equally explicitly) allows. In these instances, neither the principle of
harmonious interpretation nor most conflict rules in general international law,
TRIPS, or in TRIPS-plus FTAs operate in a way which would uphold an
optional flexibility over a subsequent obligation that limits its application. This
confirms the continued relevance of the minimum standards approach in
international IP law. As a rule, the ever increasing standards of protection on
the regional and bilateral level erode the optional policy space on the
multilateral level.
In some instances, however, conflict clauses in TRIPS-plus FTAs do
function as a safeguard for TRIPS flexibilities-even over concrete and precise
FTA obligations that would otherwise undermine these flexibilities. For
example, certain types of Doha-references demand an interpretation and
implementation of FTA provisions that does not undermine the flexibilities
listed in the Doha Declaration. In a nutshell, the more specifically and
demandingly a clause refers to the Doha Declaration, the more effective it is in
safeguarding the TRIPS flexibilities mentioned therein. Also, clauses referring
generally to TRIPS flexibilities and exceptions can have such a safeguarding
effect-especially where certain TRIPS-plus obligations are made "subject to"
the right to use TRIPS flexibilities. Other effective tools are clauses referring to
specific TRIPS flexibilities in a way that "nothing in the FTA IP provisions
shall be construed to prevent" an FTA party from relying on a specific TRIPS
provision.
A different picture emerges where TRIPS-plus FTA obligations are
ambiguous, open-textured, or otherwise allow for an interpretation and
implementation which sufficiently takes TRIPS flexibilities into account. Here,
most conflict clauses in FTAs operate as sufficient safeguards-from those
merely affirming WTO/TRIPS rights and obligations, via Doha-references, to
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provisions which refer to TRIPS flexibilities and exceptions to IP protection.
As the default rule, the concepts of harmonious interpretation and systemic
integration in general international law would lead to the same result. The limits
to this interpretative approach are set out in the VCLT principles of treaty
interpretation. If the ordinary meaning and context of the TRIPS-plus rule,
understood in light of the relevant treaty object and purpose, does not allow
alignment with the right to exercise TRIPS flexibilities, a harmonious
interpretation is not possible.
Overall, the emerging set of conflict rules in TRIPS-plus FTAs is most
promising in opening doors and pathways towards creative interpretation and
implementation of FTA obligations on IP protection. They often can be used
to achieve policy space similar or equivalent to that offered by TRIPS
flexibilities. But, this requires the willingness and ability of interested FTA
parties to do so. And, maybe more importantly, it depends on the absence of
pressure and bullying by those who have traditionally demanded TRIPS-plus
FTAs against such creative interpretation and implementation. However, on a
more conceptual level, some of the conflict rules analysed here can operate as
tools of normative integration-making the Doha Declaration or certain TRIPS
flexibilities part of the balance of FTA rights and obligations. In this sense, the
term integration-or assimilation-rules may be more appropriate.
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